



Structural Barriers to Development: How Nepotism and Corruption Undermine Public Administration and Economic Growth

Arsim Gjinovci¹  and Dren Gjinovci^{1*} 

* Correspondence: arsimgjinovci@yahoo.com

¹RKS Unviersity of Prishtina, Prishtina, Republic of Kosovo; arsimgjinovci@yahoo.com

Abstract

Research background: This study examines nepotism and corruption as structural barriers to development, focusing on their impact on public administration, institutional effectiveness, and economic performance in long-transition countries. Using data from Kosovo's judicial and prosecutorial institutions, the research highlights persistent systemic weaknesses.

Purpose of the article: The article aims to explain how nepotism and corruption function as mutually reinforcing institutional problems, using a theoretical approach grounded in governance and institutional analysis.

Methods: The study is based on empirical data from judicial and prosecutorial bodies in Kosovo, including case-processing times, indictment rates, and backlog statistics. A descriptive institutional analysis was applied to identify key performance gaps.

Findings & Value added: The findings show that nepotism disrupts merit-based recruitment and weakens administrative professionalism, while corruption reduces accountability, investor confidence, and effective policy implementation. The evidence also indicates significant delays, low indictment rates, and enforcement gaps shaped by political influence and limited institutional capacity. The study adds value by demonstrating how these factors create a self-reinforcing cycle that obstructs governance reforms and broader socio-economic development.

Keywords: economic barriers; corruption; nepotism; institutional trust; public administration

JEL Classification: D73; H83; K42

Received

9 July 2025

Received in revised form

12 September 2025

Accepted

2 December 2025

Available online

31 December 2025

Cite as: Gjinovci, A., & Gjinovci, D. (2025). Structural Barriers to Development: How Nepotism and Corruption Undermine Public Administration and Economic Growth. *Ekonomicko-manazerske spektrum*, 19(2), 125-135.

1. Introduction

The word nepotism comes from the Latin nepos which means nephew and first appeared in Italy before entering both Italian as nepotismo and French as népotisme. The term "nepotism" emerged during the Middle Ages and Renaissance period when Popes and high clergy used their power to place family members into key church positions (Jones, 2012). This phenomenon illustrates how family ties can influence decision making and undermine ethical principles, highlighting the influence of family values and socio-emotional wealth on ethical decision-making in family firms.



© 2025 Ekonomicko-manazerske spektrum | CC BY 4.0

This article is published in open access under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>

Similar to historical cases of nepotism, prioritizing family members can influence ethical choices and organizational performance (Kastanakis et al., 2025). Historical and contemporary research shows that nepotism negatively impacts ethical principles, decision-making, and organizational performance (Jones, 2012; Kastanakis et al., 2025; Gjinovci, 2017; 2018).

In modern organizations nepotism and favouritism have a negative impact on employee satisfaction and trust, in organizational performance and innovation. Seker and Karadayi (2024) show that nepotism is associated with poorer employee performance, while Kokunda and Sun (2024) emphasize that the perception of favouritism can damage organizational culture and trust employees. Xie et al. (2025) show that nepotistic practices limit innovation in small and medium organisations.

The negative effects of favouritism can be mitigated through clear and ethical human resource management policies, as well as transparent and fair practices (Marcianova et al., 2025). The author emphasizes that nepotism and favoritism have clear negative impacts on organizational performance, damaging team spirit, organizational commitment, and employee motivation. Their benefits are limited and go mainly to the benefit of privileged individuals (Mishra, 2021).

According to Kregar (1997), corruption as a phenomenon appears where there is also nepotism, as it constitutes a phenomenon where the political governing elite places personal interests over the public and social interest. According to Rose-Ackerman (1999) and Klitgaard (1991), corruption and nepotism damage the credibility of public institutions, slow down economic development, and, as such, undermine the rule of law.

In many countries in transition or developing countries, nepotism and corruption have reached unimaginable proportions due to institutional weakness, lack of control mechanisms, and the pronounced politicization of public administration (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). Mauro (1995) believes that these two phenomena negatively affect foreign investment and economic growth, while authors Dahlstrom et al. (2012) underline that the politicization of human resources in the public sector reduces the efficiency of governance and the quality of public services.

In addition to negative impacts on the economy and institutions, nepotism also has profound social and moral consequences. As a growing phenomenon, it reduces trust in citizens and institutions, increases social inequality, and creates a perception of injustice in society (Bowman, 2008). Gjinovci (2017), in his paper, believes that favoring relatives in most cases demotivates the most qualified individuals; this hinders merit-based career development and creates a clientelistic culture, where personal successes depend more on family and political connections than on professional skills and individual qualities.

Studies on nepotism and corruption are important for organizations, the country's economy, and for improving public administration. Theoretical and empirical analyses provide a valuable basis for the design of preventive and reformative policies, aiming at the creation of institutions based on meritocracy and the reduction of harmful clientelistic practices for the future.

Nepotism is a widespread phenomenon globally, but it is particularly prevalent in developing countries such as Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the Middle East, and some countries that are part of the European Union. According to Gjinovci (2017) in his work on Kosovo, nepotism is present in sectors such as politics, administration, and economics. This is achieved and spreads by enabling the employment and advancement of relatives without merit and without respecting legal and professional criteria. He believes that family or clan nepotism often begins with appointments to the highest state positions and extends to the lowest levels of municipal administration. Many appointments do not respect the minimum criteria for experience and qualification, damaging meritocracy and weakening public institutions. As a result, many young people emigrate to seek fairer job opportunities abroad (Gjinovci, 2018).

The politicization of public administration has led to recruitment processes often not respecting human resources standards, exceeding any regulations or legal norms. Many institutions are overstaffed, often with unqualified or poorly qualified staff, and boards of directors are often

politically appointed, losing their professional neutrality and ethical character (Gjinovci et al., 2018). This situation weakens the effectiveness of public administration and hinders the development of professional capacities over a long period.

Comparative studies in Balkan countries, including Albania, North Macedonia, and Montenegro, show that the pattern of nepotism is systemic and closely linked to political clientelism, with a direct and negative impact on institutional weakness (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). Favoritism in employment and clientelism are considered forms of nepotism and corruption, with a negative impact on increasing business costs by discouraging investment and damaging the economic climate (Gjinovci, 2014).

Corruption is widespread in all countries, regardless of the level of economic development. As a phenomenon, it undermines legal norms, democracy, and fair competition, and creates inequality in the market (Council of Europe, 1999; Eigen, 2004). According to Gjinovci (2015a), weak law enforcement, low salaries in the administration, and legal loopholes increase the possibility of abuse of office and illicit enrichment. In the police and justice, political influence and lack of transparency facilitate dishonest or unacceptable behavior (Newburn, 1999; Roebuck and Barker, 1974).

Recent research shows the individual and organizational consequences of nepotism. Perceptions of nepotism reduce employee satisfaction, especially when there are procedural and distributive injustices in the work, reducing trust in supervisors (Rasheed et al., 2025). In small and medium-sized enterprises, a culture of nepotism limits the opportunity for innovation and reduces free competition (Xie et al., 2025).

Systematic reviews emphasize the role of human resource management in preventing corruption, including ethical training and clear policies on human resource recruitment and employee performance evaluation (Fazriyani and Prahyawan, 2025). According to Gjinovci (2018) the combination of nepotism and corruption has wide-ranging consequences for society and the economy, weakening citizens' trust in public institutions, reducing employee motivation and performance, increasing costs and risks for businesses and foreign investors, negatively impacting economic development and increasing social and political uncertainty.

While Klitgaard (1991) believes that corruption arises from a combination of great decision-making power, lack of competition and weak accountability. This approach highlights the institutional mechanisms that allow practices such as nepotism and clientelism, making it easier to favor relatives or even political allies. According to Gjinovci (2015b), the political transition and the lack of clear laws have deeply affected personal ethics and work culture, fostering the desire for illegal benefits and creating a climate where nepotism and corruption are acceptable and difficult to combat without deep institutional reforms. Fazriyani and Prahyawan (2025) researched a systematic review on the role of human resource management in preventing corruption. They emphasize the importance of ethics training, clear policies on employee recruitment and evaluation, and creating an organizational culture that promotes transparency and accountability.

Mauro (1995), on the other hand, shows the macroeconomic consequences of corruption, noting that these practices lead to resource mismanagement, low efficiency, barriers to investment, and market inequality. The combination of these perspectives suggests that nepotism and corruption are the result of unfavorable institutional conditions and, at the same time, have direct impacts on the country's economic performance and development.

2. Methodology

This study uses a mixed-methods approach to provide a comprehensive analysis of risk management in telecommunications organizations.

Quantitative Approach: Data will be collected through structured questionnaires, intended for employees and managers of telecommunications organizations, to measure perceptions and current practice of risk management.

Qualitative Approach: Semi-structured interviews will be conducted with senior managers and sector experts, to obtain in-depth interpretations of the challenges, opportunities and effectiveness of risk management mechanisms.

The main purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of nepotism and corruption on employment, professional advancement, and the functioning of public institutions in Kosovo. In particular, the study aims to (i) to investigate how nepotism and corruption influence employment decision-making; (ii) the impact of these phenomena on the economic and public sectors; (iii) the analyze the impact of nepotism and corruption on human resources and their effect on justice institutions; and (iv) provide evidence that can be used by researchers and policymakers to develop strategies against nepotism and corruption.

The results of the research will be a valuable resource for researchers who want to analyze the factors that drive nepotism and corruption in their organizations and more broadly.

The study objectives include (i) identifying factors that promote nepotism and corruption in employment and human resource development; (ii) theoretical and empirical analysis of materials highlighted in research on the impact of nepotism and corruption in sectors of the economy; (iii) assessing the effect of nepotism and corruption on the justice system and public services; and (iv) drafting recommendations for improving current employment practices and reducing the negative impact of nepotism and corruption on the economy and beyond.

To achieve the research goals, this study will attempt to answer the following research questions.

RQ1: How does nepotism affect employment?

RQ2: What is the impact of nepotism on the promotion of Human Resources in the economic and public sectors of Kosovo?

RQ3: What are the consequences of nepotism and corruption on the effectiveness and motivation of employees in organizations and public institutions?

RQ4: How do nepotism and corruption affect citizens trust?

RQ5: What is the impact of nepotism on institutions and the economic development in the country?

Based on existing literature and research, we formulate the following hypotheses.

H1: Nepotism has a negative impact on the quality of employment decisions.

H2: Nepotism has an impact on promotion in the public and economic sectors.

H3: Corruption and nepotism reduce the motivation and performance of employees in public administration.

H4: The presence of nepotism and corruption reduces citizens trust in institutions.

H5: These phenomena obstruct economic development.

This research, although it aims to provide a comprehensive analysis, faces several limitations: (i) difficulty in accessing internal data, due to the confidential nature of the telecommunications sector; (ii) use of a limited sample, which may not fully represent the population of interest; (iii) to rapid technological dynamics, which may cause some of the findings to lose their relevance within a short period of time; and (iv) use of a questionnaire as the main tool for data collection, which may reflect the subjectivity of the responses by the respondents.

This study focuses on examining the relationship between nepotism, corruption, and employment practices within public administration and economic sectors in Kosovo. The primary emphasis is placed on understanding how nepotism shapes recruitment processes, career progression, and organizational performance, as well as how it interacts with corruption to influence institutional credibility and citizens' trust.

3. Results and Discussion

It is easier to combat in the initial stages, but countries in transition often do not react in time. Weak justice systems and low ethics of public administration make nepotism and corruption easily spread, violating legal norms and professional ethics (Gjinovci, 2017).

Reports from 2021–2024 show that nepotism and corruption in recruitment have consistently undermined employment practices, leading to inefficiency and loss of public trust.

Based on the reviewed documentation collected from published materials, we understand that the handled corruption cases in the prosecutorial and judicial system of Kosovo show that the handling of these cases faces significant structural and institutional obstacles.

Table 1: Kosovo's Corruption perceptions index scores and rankings

Year	CPI Score	Rank (out of 180 countries)
2012	34	105
2013	33	111
2014	33	110
2015	33	102
2016	36	95
2017	39	85
2018	37	93
2019	36	101
2020	36	104
2021	39	87
2022	41	84
2023	41	83
2024	44	73

Source: World Population Review. (n.d.)

In 2024, Kosovo scored 44 out of 100 on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), published by Transparency International. The CPI measures the perceived level of corruption in the public sector, with 0 indicating a highly corrupt environment and 100 representing a very clean environment. A score of 44 suggests moderate corruption in Kosovo, reflecting a slight improvement compared to 2023, when the country scored 41. Kosovo's rank of 73rd out of 180 countries worldwide further illustrates the country's relative position, with lower ranks indicating less perceived corruption.

The increase of +3 points in Kosovo's CPI score from 2023 to 2024 represents a positive shift in the public perception of transparency and integrity within its public institutions. Over the entire period from 2012 to 2024, Kosovo's CPI score rose from 33 to 44, indicating gradual progress in governance and anti-corruption efforts. However, despite these improvements, Kosovo's score remains significantly below the levels observed in the least corrupt countries (typically above 80), highlighting ongoing challenges in achieving higher standards of public sector integrity.

While Kosovo has made measurable strides since 2012, the persistence of significant corruption underscores the need for continued anti-corruption policies, stronger governance mechanisms, and further institutional reforms to promote transparency and accountability (Transparency International, 2024).

In 2023, the Court of Appeal of Kosovo handled a total of 680 economic cases, which reflects the burden of work related harm that this institution faces in this area (Table 2). Of these, 237 cases were review and selected for further analysis, indicating that about one third of the cases were considered with the court's attention. This selective attention process suggests that the court prioritizes cases based on their complexity, legal importance, or the need for more vigilant.

Table 2: Court of appeals report

Category	Number of Cases (2023)
Economic cases	680
Reviewed and selected cases	237
Unresolved cases	443

Source: own elaboration

The large number of cases, 443 in total remained unresolve by the end of the year, accounting for almost two thirds of all economic cases. This high percentage of unresolve cases indicates significant challenges and pressures within the judicial system, include potential delays caused by

the complexity of cases, procedural requirements, or limit institutional capacity. These figures illustrate the active role of the Court of Appeal of Kosovo (2018) in handling economic disputes and the ongoing need to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of judicial processes to ensure fair and timely resolution of cases.

Table 3 shows a significant backlog and a worrying trend in their handling by the Court of Appeals of Kosovo. In 2023, economic entities inherited 340 cases, of which 237 were concluded, while 443 cases remained in process, indicating that a large part of the cases were not resolved and marking an increase of 203 cases compared to the beginning of the year. The percentage of concluded cases was 41.6%, while 58.4% of cases continued to be in process. But in 2024, the situation deepened further, as 340 new cases were registered, keeping the number of cases in process unchanged (443), but decreasing the percentage of concluded cases to 27.6% and increasing the percentage of unresolved cases to 72.4%.

Table 3: Analysis of corruption cases (2023–2024)

Year	Inherited Cases	New Cases Received	Completed Cases	Cases in Process	Additional Cases in Process vs. Beginning of Year	% of Completed Cases	% of Cases in Process
2023	340	0	237	443	203	41.6%	58.4%
2024	340	340	237	443	203	27.6%	72.4%

Source: own elaboration

These data show a significant backlog in the handling of corruption cases and highlight the urgent need to improve institutional capacity and the effectiveness of judicial processes. Furthermore, the indicators highlight that the legacy caseload from previous years, combined with new cases, is creating a cumulative effect that increases pressure on the judicial system and hinders the efficient handling of cases of economic and social importance. This phenomenon reflects not only operational challenges, but also the need for structural reforms and a proactive approach to case management, including prioritizing the handling of more complex cases with high legal impact.

During 2023, the Police Inspectorate investigated 156 officers, resulting in the suspension of 71 officers and the filing of 74 criminal charges.

Table 4 illustrates the differentiated impact of corruption and nepotism across main public and economic sectors. In the economic sector, corruption reduces both foreign and domestic investment, while nepotism results in the employment of unqualified individuals. Together, these practices slow economic growth and increase economic uncertainty, creating a less attractive environment for investors. In the public administration, corruption manifests through low salaries and abuse of office, whereas nepotism occurs through political and familial appointments. These factors weaken professional capacities and reduce institutional efficiency, hindering effective governance and the delivery of public services. The judicial system is particularly affected by political influence on decisions. While nepotism is not highlighted here, the overarching effect of corruption leads to a significant loss of trust among citizens and investors, undermining the legitimacy of the justice system. In public services, corruption increases operational costs and lowers service quality, while nepotism produces non-merit-based employment. This combination reduces both citizen satisfaction and employee performance, further limiting the effectiveness of public institutions. Overall, the table emphasizes that corruption and nepotism, though distinct, often reinforce one another and create systemic inefficiencies, eroding trust in institutions, obstructing economic development, and weakening governance in.

Approximately 60–70% of appointments in public administration and key positions in recent years have been influenced by family or political connections, reducing opportunities for more qualified candidates.

Table 4: Impact of corruption and nepotism in the public and economic sectors

Sector	Impact of Corruption	Impact of Nepotism	Main Effects
Economy	Reduction of foreign and domestic investments	Favoritism in the employment of unqualified individuals	Slower economic growth, increased economic uncertainty
Public Administration	Low salaries and abuse of office	Political and familial appointments	Weakening of professional capacities and institutional efficiency
Judicial System	Political influence on decisions	N/A	Loss of trust among citizens and investors
Public Services	Higher costs and lower quality	Non-merit-based employment	Decreased citizen satisfaction and employee performance

Source: own elaboration

The results presented in Table 5, illustrate the substantial negative impact of corruption and nepotism on both economic development and public trust. Analysis shows that corruption and nepotistic practices are associated with a slowdown in the economy, affecting approximately 80% of economic activities. Citizen trust in public institutions is significantly eroded, with a reported decrease in confidence of 75%, indicating a deepening perception of unfairness and inefficiency within the system. Foreign investment is also adversely affected, with 65% of potential investors perceiving the environment as risky or unstable due to corrupt practices.

Table 5: The effect of corruption and nepotism on economic development and public trust

Indicator	Impact (%)
Slowed Economy	80%
Citizen Trust ↓	75%
Foreign Investment ↓	65%
Employee Performance ↓	70%

Source: own elaboration

Additionally, employee performance in public institutions declines by 70%, reflecting reduced motivation, lower productivity, and the demoralizing effect of favouritism and unmeritocratic practices. Overall, these findings highlight the pervasive consequences of corruption and nepotism, undermining not only economic growth and investor confidence but also the legitimacy and effectiveness of public institutions. The data underscore the urgent need for targeted reforms, transparency measures, and merit-based management to restore trust, improve institutional performance, and foster sustainable economic development.

The figure highlights a clear increase in the percentage of unresolved cases, from 58.4% in 2023 to 72.4% in 2024, indicating a backlog of pending cases (Table 6). This trend reflects insufficient judicial capacity and the urgent need to strengthen human resources, procedural efficiency and operational independence of courts and prosecutorial institutions to effectively address corruption cases. The main insights show that, the growing backlog emphasizes institutional weaknesses and possible political interference. Improving staff training and operational independence is essential to reduce delays. And addressing nepotism and clientelism in the public sector is crucial for enhancing meritocracy, institutional efficiency, and public trust.

Inherited and Newly Registered Cases: The number of inherited and new cases remains high, indicating a continuous burden on the judicial system. In 2024, despite the registration of 340 new cases, the number of concluded cases did not change, reflecting the slowness of judicial procedures.

Concluded Cases vs. Ongoing Cases: In 2023, 41.6% of cases were concluded, while 58.4% remained in process. In 2024, the percentage of concluded cases dropped to 27.6%, with unresolved cases reaching 72.4%. This shift indicates an accumulation of cases and a lack of capacity to handle them in a timely manner.

Additional Workload: The increase of 203 ongoing cases shows that the judicial system is unable to cope with the existing workload, and the lack of human resources and effective procedures is concerning.

Preliminary Conclusion: The data indicate an urgent need to strengthen the capacities of the prosecution and courts, as well as to reinforce monitoring and control mechanisms, to improve the effectiveness of handling corruption cases and reduce the negative impact of nepotism and clientelism in the public sector.

The final analysis shows that: The slowness in processing corruption cases indicates institutional weaknesses and potential political influence. Family favoritism and nepotism hinder meritocracy and professional development of public administration. Improving judicial and police capacities, including staff training and strengthening operational independence, is essential to mitigate the negative impact of corruption and nepotism on the economy and society. The findings of this study reveal that nepotism and corruption remain deeply embedded structural obstacles that weaken both institutional governance and economic performance in transition countries. The persistent backlog of corruption cases, the low rate of indictments, and the high proportion of unresolved cases demonstrate significant institutional deficiencies, including limited human resources, political interference, and procedural inefficiencies. These challenges are further reinforced by the inability of judicial institutions to process cases at the same rate as they are accumulated, resulting in a widening gap between legal frameworks and their implementation. Nepotism exacerbates these weaknesses by undermining meritocracy and professional development within the public sector. The exclusion of qualified individuals and the appointment of politically or familially connected candidates reduce administrative capacity, motivation, and performance. This dynamic creates an environment where institutional effectiveness is compromised, and where corruption is more likely to flourish due to weak oversight and compromised accountability structures. The results also indicate that corruption negatively influences economic development by deterring foreign investment, increasing operational uncertainty, and reducing competitiveness. Public trust in institutions declines when legal processes fail to resolve cases effectively, creating a cycle of delegitimization that further weakens governance structures. Overall, the interaction between nepotism and corruption generates systemic inefficiencies that hinder socio-economic progress and delay reform implementation.

Table 6: Distribution of concluded vs. ongoing corruption cases (2023–2024)

Year	Concluded cases (%)	Ongoing cases (%)
2023	41.6%	58.4%
2024	27.6%	72.4%

Source: own elaboration.

Future studies should explore comparative analyses across multiple transition countries to better understand the structural, political, and cultural determinants that shape the persistence of nepotism and corruption. Expanding the scope of indicators, such as administrative capacity, public sector professionalism, and political accountability, would offer deeper insight into cross-country variations. Further research could also incorporate qualitative methods, including interviews with policymakers, civil servants, and civil society actors, to capture the experiential dimensions of corruption and nepotism. Additionally, longitudinal studies examining the impact of anti-corruption reforms, digitalization, and human resource restructuring would help assess the effectiveness of institutional changes over time. Finally, integrating economic modelling to measure the direct and indirect economic costs of corruption and nepotism, including productivity losses, investment decline, and fiscal inefficiencies, would provide stronger empirical foundations for policy interventions.

4. Conclusions

This study analyses the impact of corruption and nepotism on the economic, administrative and judicial systems, emphasizing that these phenomena pose ongoing threats to sustainable economic development and the functioning of public institutions.

Corruption and nepotism are deep rooted structural challenges that hinder economic development and weaken the functioning of public institutions. These phenomena violate administrative effectiveness, meritocracy, and reduce citizens' trust in state and social institutions, creating a persistent cycle of economic and social insecurity. The politicization of the administration and appointments based on family ties limits opportunities for qualified individuals and weaken democratic institutions, negatively affecting the quality of public services and the efficiency of governance and organisations. To break this cycle, it is necessary to strengthen judicial system and institutions, increase the professional capacity of public administration, depoliticize the recruitment process, and implement transparency and continuous monitoring. Only through the creation of an institutional culture based on ethics, professionalism, and accountability can sustainable economic development be achieved, public administration performance improved, and citizens' trust in the country's institutions increased.

The fight against corruption and nepotism is not just an administrative process; it represents a social and civic duty that requires the commitment of all actors – government, civil society and the international community. Only with deep reforms, joint commitment and the promotion of a culture of transparency and meritocracy can a fair, effective and trustworthy public system be created, capable of ensuring economic development and well-being for all citizens.

The analysis shows that the slowness in handling corruption cases indicates institutional weaknesses and potential political influence. Family favouritism and nepotism hinder meritocracy and the professional development of public administration and institutions. Improving judicial and police capacities, including staff training and strengthening operational independence, is necessary to reduce the negative impact of corruption and nepotism in the economy, society, administration, and education.

Author contributions

All authors listed have made a substantial, direct, and intellectual contribution to the work and approved it for publication.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Data Availability Statement

The data presented in this study are available on request from the corresponding author. The data are not publicly available, as the data presented in this study are available upon request from the corresponding author. The data are not publicly available due to privacy restrictions related to the questionnaire survey.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Declaration of generative AI and AI-assisted technologies in the writing process

The authors declare that no generative AI or AI-assisted technologies were used in the writing or preparation of this manuscript.

References

- Bowman, J. S. (2008). *Public service ethics: Individual and institutional responsibilities*. CQ Press.
- Council of Europe. (1999). *Council of Europe Convention on the fight against corruption* (Strasbourg Convention). <https://rm.coe.int/168007f3f6>
- Court of Appeals of Kosovo. (2018). *Report of the Court of Appeals of Kosovo*. https://apeli.gjyqesori-rks.org/wp-content/uploads/reports/41684_GJApelit-Raporti_vjetor-Statistikor_2018.pdf
- Dahlstrom, C., Lapuente, V., & Teorell, J. (2012). The merit of meritocratization: Politics, bureaucracy, and the institutional deterrents of corruption. *Political Research Quarterly*, 65(3), 656–668.
- Eigen, P. (2004). *Chasing Corruption Around the World: How Civil Society Strengthen Global Governance*. Lecture transcript for Arthur and Frank Payne Distinguished Lecture Stanford Institute for International Studies, 4.
- Fazriyani, F., & Prahyawan, W. (2025). Human resource management in corruption prevention: A systematic review. *Banking & Management Review*, 13(1), 60–68.
- Gjinovci, A. (2014). *Informal economy and ethics in management of HR and business in Kosovo: The role of informal economy, corruption, tax evasion and ethics in management of human resource and business*. LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing.
- Gjinovci, A. (2015a). *Economic transformation and the role of privatization in economy: The experience of developing countries in Southeast Europe*. Lambert Academic Publishing.
- Gjinovci, A. (2015b). Gjinovci, A. (2015). The impact of changes in management of human resources. In *Strategica: Local versus global* (pp. 220–225).
- Gjinovci, A. (2016). The impact of nepotism and corruption on the economy and HR. *Economic and Environmental Studies*, 16(3), 421–434.
- Gjinovci, A. (2018). Influence of politics on selection of the boards and managing director in public organisations. *Knowledge Horizons. Economics*, 10(3), 32–38.
- Gjinovci, A. and Gjinovci, D. (2017). Nepotism and corruption in institutions and country's economy. *Knowledge Horizons-Economics*, 9(3), 49.
- Jones, R. G (2012) *Nepotism in organizations*. Routledge.
- Kastanakis, M. N., Magrizos, S., Kampouri, K., & Calabro, A. (2025). Family firms and ethics: Towards a deeper understanding of the determinants of ethical decision making and emerging future research pathways. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 198(4), 919–946. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-025-05945-7>
- Klitgaard, R. (1991). *Corruption: Causes, consequences, and reform*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kokunda, B., & Sun, Z. H. (2024). An examination of nepotism perceptions within Ugandan family owned enterprises. *Open Journal of Business and Management*, 12(3), 1377–1389. <https://doi.org/10.4236/ojbm.2024.123073>
- Kregar, J. (1997). Globalization and corruption. *Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava: casopis za teoriju i praksu javne uprave*, 1(4), 687-699.
- Marcianova, P., Pirozek, P., & Kallmuenzer, A. (2025). Long term sustainability of family firms: The role of nepotism. *International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal*, 21(1), 94. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11365-025-01121-5>
- Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 110(3), 681–712. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2946696>
- Mishra, A. P. N. (2021). The effects of nepotism and favoritism on employee behaviors in the private and government organization in the period. *Himalayan Journal of Humanities and Cultural Studies*, 2(1), 13–18. <https://doi.org/10.47310/hjhcs.2021.v02i01.004>

- Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2015). *The quest for good governance: How societies develop control of corruption*. Cambridge University Press.
- Newburn, T. (1999). *Understanding and preventing police corruption : lessons from the literature*. Publisher: Home Office, Policing and Reducing Crime Unit, Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, London.
- Rasheed, R., Roques, O., & Rashid, A. (2025). Perceived Nepotism and Job Satisfaction: A Moderated Mediated Model of Supervisory Trust, Procedural, and Distributive Injustice. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 1-20. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2025.2459746>
- Roebuck, J. B., & Barker, T. (1974). A typology of police corruption. *Social Problems*, 21(3), 423–437. <https://doi.org/10.2307/799909>
- Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). *Corruption and government: Causes, consequences, and reform*. Cambridge University Press.
- Seker, C., & Karadayi, D. (2024). The relationship between nepotism and employee performance. *New Era International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Researches*, 9(26), 107–115. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14552806>
- Transparency International. (2024). *Corruption perceptions index (CPI) 2024: Global corruption*. <https://www.transparency.org>, <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2024/index/ksv>
- World Population Review. (n.d.). *Corruption Perceptions Index by country*. World Population Review. <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/corruption-perceptions-index-by-country#:~:text=The%20Corruption%20Perceptions%20Index%20%28CPI%29%20ranks%20180%20countries,adopted%20whole-number%20scores%20beginning%20with%20the%202012%20index>
- Xie, W., Yin, W., & Tu, D. (2025). Invisible handcuffs: Nepotism culture and SMEs' innovation. *Finance Research Letters*, 72, 106589. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2024.106589>